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a b s t r a c t
There is a limited understanding of the conditions under which payments for ecosystem services (PES)
programmes achieve improvements in ecosystem service (ES) ﬂows, enhance natural resource sustain-
ability or foster sustainable livelihoods. We used a capital asset framework to evaluate PES programmes
in terms of their social, environmental, economic and institutional outcomes, focusing on efﬁciency,
effectiveness and equity trade-offs. We found that PES schemes can provide positive conservation and
development outcomes with respect to livelihoods, land-use change, household and community
incomes, and governance. However, programmes differ with regards to contract agreements, payment
modes, and compliance, and have diverse cross-sector institutional arrangements that remain primarily
state-structured and external donor-ﬁnanced. There is a consistent lack of focus on evaluating and
fostering human, social and institutional capital. This reﬂects general inattention to how PES
programmes consider the causal links between ES and outcomes. To enhance ES production and PES
scheme accessibility and participation, we recommend strengthening the linkages between ES produc-
tion and land-use practices, boosting private and voluntary sector involvement, encouraging property
rights and tenure reform, improving ﬁnancial viability, and adequately accounting for the distribution of
programme costs and beneﬁts among participants.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
1. Introduction
The application of market-based incentive (MBI) mechanisms
to deal with the challenges of landscape and environmental
protection, climate mitigation, wetland restoration and biodiver-
sity conservation is growing (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010;
Muradian and Rival, 2012; Pirard, 2012). This signals an underlying
shift in national and international natural resource use policy
(Farley and Costanza, 2010; Pokorny et al., 2012). The emergence
of MBIs have been justiﬁed on the grounds that they correct
market failures, reduce information asymmetry, provide price
signals for decision makers, and bridge the conservation funding
gap (Gomez-Baggethun and Ruíz-Perez, 2011; Pirard, 2012).
Despite these endorsements concerns remain. For some, MBIs
represent a plurality of ‘hybrid governance’ instruments that
conﬂate conceptually different philosophies and mechanisms
(i.e., rewards, incentives, markets), often addressing social–envir-
onmental problems not externalities arising from market failures
(Muradian and Gómez-Baggethun, 2013; Muradian, 2013). There
are also doubts over the ability of MBIs to adequately secure the
provision of public goods and common pool resources (Muradian
and Rival, 2012; Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2010; Kinzig et al.,
2011; Lockie, 2013) whilst providing cost-effective policy (Kemkes
et al., 2010). Other challenges include potential misapplication of
MBIs (Lockie, 2013); the propensity to commoditize nature (Kosoy
and Corbera, 2010), which could lead to reductions in ecological
complexity and a ‘commodity ﬁction’ (Gomez-Baggethun and
Ruíz-Perez, 2011; Muradian and Rival, 2012; Robertson, 2012);
and the perception that MBIs represent encroaching neo-liberalist
interventions (McAfee and Shapiro, 2010; McElwee, 2012; Arsel
and Büscher, 2012; McAfee, 2012; Shapiro-Garza, 2013).
Nonetheless, the MBI model has been applied in many devel-
oping countries in the form of payment for ecosystem services
(PES) programmes (Shelley, 2011; van Noordwijk et al., 2012;
Tacconi, 2012; Derissen and Latacz-Lohmann, 2013) as a policy
tool intended to address a spectrum of land management chal-
lenges (Landen-Mills, 2002; Landell-Mills and Porras 2002;
Wunder, 2006; Engel et al., 2008; Bond and Mayers, 2010). PES
has been presented as an alternative to traditional command-and-
control approaches, which through encouraging more decentra-
lised management has the potential to advance both conservation
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and rural livelihood development goals (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002;
van Noordwijk et al., 2007; Agrawal et al., 2008; Pokorny et al.,
2012; Muradian and Rival, 2012).
However, the widespread adoption of PES masks important
issues (Pirard et al., 2010). The validity and suitability of formulat-
ing PES theory on Coasean grounds has been challenged because
of the complexity, uncertainty, and asset speciﬁcity involved in
managing ecosystem services (Farley and Costanza, 2010; Kosoy
and Corbera, 2010; Muradian et al., 2010; Vatn, 2010; Muradian,
2013). Some argue that win-win conservation and development
outcomes are likely if programmes are well designed (Pokorny
et al., 2012; Kinzig et al., 2011), while others regard this as too
optimistic given the inﬂuence of diverse contingent factors
(Redford and Adams, 2009; Muradian et al., 2013). A number of
practical obstacles may also hinder PES implementation: scheme
design and payment structure (e.g., Engel et al., 2008; Kelsey Jack
et al., 2008; Kemkes et al., 2010; Adhikari and Boag, 2012); modes
of implementation (e.g., Engel and Palmer, 2008; Zhang and
Pagiola, 2011); managing trade-offs arising from the need to
balance efﬁciency, effectiveness and equity (e.g., Bor̈ner
et al., 2010; Pascual et al., 2010, Narloch et al., 2011); institutional
embeddedness and propensity to cooperate (e.g. Muradian et al.,
2010; Vatn, 2010); spatial targeting, monitoring, participation, and
compliance (e.g. Wünscher et al., 2008; Wendland et al., 2010); the
adequacy of property rights (Lockie, 2013); and social and well-
being outcomes (e.g. Bulte et al., 2008; Pattanayak et al., 2010;
Daw et al., 2011) (Supporting information Table S1).
What, then, do these theoretical and practical debates mean for
future PES prospects? Given that PES adoption will continue (Bond
and Mayers, 2010), it is necessary to jointly assess both environ-
mental and social effects to ensure long-term PES validation and
effectiveness (Kelsey Jack et al., 2008; Farley and Costanza, 2010;
Brouwer et al., 2011). To this end, we conducted a systematic
review of the measured environmental and socio-economic out-
comes of PES programmes. Systematic reviews are used widely in
medical (Popay, 2006) and ecological sciences (Sutherland et al.,
2004; Pullin et al., 2009) to gather evidence and generalise
ﬁndings. We structured our review using a capital asset frame-
work (CAF). The CAF originated as a rural livelihood assessment
tool emphasising the interactions between individual- and
community-level assets, and how collective action could be used
to maintain various assets and resource ﬂows to nurture local
empowerment and foster development (Carney, 1998; Bebbington,
1999; Rudd, 2000; Green and Haines, 2008). The CAF connects
socio-ecological context, institutional structure, the effects of
changes in capital asset and their resource ﬂows, and options for
economic or political interventions based on actors' or societal
values (Rudd, 2004). It has been used in diverse situations to
analyse the transformative ability of assets to support rural
livelihoods and reduce poverty in the Andes (Bebbington, 1999),
assess poverty alleviation opportunities of a compensation-reward
scheme for ecosystem services (van Noordwijk et al., 2007),
identify barriers to the adoption of agricultural greenhouse gas
mitigation measures in rural communities (Dulal et al., 2010), and
appraise capacity-building requirements for tourism development
in gateway communities bordering protected areas (Bennett et al.,
2012).
We assessed the extent to which PES programmes represent
effective environmental management tools based on their effects
on social, environmental, ﬁnancial and institutional capital assets.
Our goal was to provide a means of appraising PES studies (and the
programmes they describe) in a manner that enables improve-
ments in scheme design, application and implementation. We
systematically collated, consolidated and analysed PES literature
describing speciﬁc programmes and the ‘measured outcomes’
of those programmes. We also collated observed barriers to
PES uptake and the potential opportunities for enhancing PES
programme success. Our approach builds on work by Wunder
et al. (2008), Daniels et al. (2010) and Pattanayak et al. (2010) but,
by adopting a CAF approach, introduces a new means by which
PES programme management interventions can be systematically
appraised.
2. Materials and methods
Following various guidelines for systematic and related reviews
(e.g., Petticrew and Egan, 2006; Cooper, 2010; Centre for Evidence-
Based Conservation, 2013) our sequential four step process to the
systematic review (Fig. 1) proceeded from evidence gathering to
critical analysis.
2.1. Step 1 – search strategy
Relevant studies were located via three sources: scientiﬁc
databases; internet searches and websites; and journal special
issues. Databases we searched included: ISI Web of Knowledge (all
databases); Science Direct (SciVerse); Scirus; and OvidSP (see
Supporting information Table S2 for search details). Internet
searches were performed using Google (Supporting information
Table S3). Searches used combinations of keywords and the ﬁrst
50 hits retrieved were checked for relevance (Davis and Pullin,
2006; Bowler et al., 2010). We searched websites of speciﬁc
organisations with known MBI expertise and involvement (e.g.,
FAO, World Bank, Global Environment Facility, WWF, Conservation
International, Ecosystem marketplace, Watershed Markets,
Katoomba group, World Agroforestry Centre and Centre for Inter-
national Forestry Research). Journal special issues focusing on PES
included three from Ecological Economics (65 (4), 69 (7), 69(11)),
and one each from Journal of Sustainable Forestry (28 (3–5)) and
Environmental Conservation (38 (4)). We restricted our source
documents to those written in English but made efforts to locate
English translations of non-English documents whenever possible.
All document types were accepted (e.g., articles, conference
papers, theses, chapters and reports as long as the provenance of
the texts could be veriﬁed).
2.2. Steps 2 and 3 – document screening
The preliminary screening process focused on article title and
abstract relevance, and used a standardised protocol applied to all
documents to generate a ﬁrst cut of ‘relevant’ articles (Supporting
information Table S4). A second, more detailed, screening was
applied to those documents to obtain the ﬁnal sample frame; we
considered article type, theoretical content, and empirical evidence,
and used a standardised protocol (Supporting information Table S5)
in conjunction with additional study inclusion and exclusion criteria
(Table 1).
2.3. Step 4 – critical analysis
Following Wunder et al. (2008), Pattanayak et al. (2010), and
Daniels et al. (2010), we pursued three appraisal avenues to
assemble our collection of studies: study appraisal (i.e., detailing
the principal methodological characteristics of each study); PES
programme evaluation (i.e., the application of the CAF to assess
programme outcomes); and PES programme deconstruction (i.e.,
dissecting the operational, institutional, and ﬁnancial arrange-
ments of the speciﬁc projects identiﬁed within the collection of
studies) (Fig. 2). For each aspect, standardised coding protocols
were employed to extract relevant information systematically and
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accurately across all studies (Supporting information Tables S6–S12
[data available upon request]).
Capital asset data were of two types. First, some data reﬂected
the interpretation of theoretically relevant attributes for various
assets. Second, in situ ‘measured outcomes’ were detailed for
individual studies. Those ‘measured outcomes’ we considered to
represent ‘effective’ (i.e. beneﬁcial or positive) programme impacts
are detailed in Table 2. A number of capital asset categorisations
are recognised in the literature, from natural, human, social,
cultural and produced (built, physical, or manufactured) capital
(Bebbington, 1999) to ﬁnancial and political capital (van Noordwijk
et al., 2007; Bennett et al., 2012). Our framework consisted of
human and social capital as an aggregated asset, natural capital,
ﬁnancial capital, and institutional capital that focused on
conservation-relevant and development-relevant properties, char-
acteristics or evaluation qualities. In other words, our
‘conservation-development perspective’ focused on those aspects
relevant to those particular contexts (e.g., social mobility, access to
social resources, land-use types, changes in ecosystem services,
payment distribution and equity, and institutional accountability
and transparency).
Natural capital refers to the structure, function and ﬂows of ESs
to humans as well as the land management practices and changes
in those practices that PES programmes may cause (Costanza and
Daly, 1992; Daily, 1997, van Noordwijk et al., 2007). Financial
capital relates to the wealth of households and communities, the
ﬂow of funds available for undertaking activities and payment
distribution and equity (Rudd, 2004; Bennett et al., 2012). Human
capital constitutes skills, knowledge, experience, and health at the
individual level (Rudd, 2004; Brondizo et al., 2009; Behrman,
2011; Winters and Chiodi, 2011; Bennett et al., 2012; Moav and
Neeman 2012), while social capital refers to social structure and
Fig. 1. Flow diagram outlining the four steps of the systematic approach.
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relations that contribute to ﬂows of norms and reputation-based
trust (Bebbington, 1999; Rudd, 2000; Adler and Kwon, 2002;
Brondizo et al., 2009). Finally, we use the term institutional capital
to refer to aspects of resource governance and institutional
transparency and accountability. Elsewhere, institutional capital
has also been referred to as the structural attributes of organisa-
tions, institutional norms, and the capacity to build competencies
(de los Hoyas and Antunez Diaz, 2012; Valente, 2012). While what
we denote as institutional capital reﬂects features of human and
social capital, the scope of this asset does not ﬁt neatly within
common conceptions of human or social capital. In light of this we
consider it justiﬁed to include a separate asset that considers the
wider institutional, organisational and governance-related perspec-
tives of a speciﬁcally environmental management intervention.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Critical analysis: study appraisal
We used a total of 44 studies in our analysis (Table 3). They
were primarily from the peer-reviewed literature (71%) and in
total considered 23 PES programmes operating at local and
national scales in 13 countries (Supporting information Table
S13). We found scholarly work concentrated largely on implemen-
tation and outcome evaluation, primarily in relation to natural and
ﬁnancial capital. The main geographic focus was Latin America,
which has historically been the main testing ground for PES.
However, PES initiatives were also identiﬁed in Asia (particularly
China) and Africa, although these programmes were fewer in
number.
Our cases employed multiple theoretical approaches to assess
programme outcomes and highlight the discourses and drivers
promoting the contextual development of PES. Eighty four per
cent of studies were multi-modal, using one or more theoretical
approaches and evaluation measures (Fig. 3). In general, studies
assessed programme additionality (66%), livelihood sustainability
(22%) and participation (20%). They situated programme-level
developments within a predominantly historical (82%) and envir-
onmental conservation (95%) frame of reference that emphasised
land-use change (98%), water protection (55%) and climate mitiga-
tion (50%) as the principal drivers of scheme introductions (Fig. 4).
Similarly, in their regional analysis of payments for watershed
services (PWS) in Latin America, Martin-Ortega et al. (2013)
identiﬁed deforestation and loss of land cover to be a comparable
driver (77%) of PWS scheme development. Poverty alleviation,
surprisingly, was mentioned in only 27% of cases as a key driver of
PES development despite the increasingly pro-poor rationale for
PES and the recognition of the effects that poverty can have on
natural capital (Bulte et al., 2008).
Various experimental designs were employed across the stu-
dies. Comparative matched-sample approaches commonly focused
on qualitative assessments achieved through survey-related meth-
odologies. However, relatively little attention was paid to assessing
social and institutional factors and developing more explanatory
social–ecological models (Fig. 5). Studies exhibited an array of
sampling (66%), methodological (75%) and analytical (27%) limita-
tions (Fig. 6).
3.2. Critical analysis: evaluating programme arrangements
and outcomes
3.2.1. Human and social capital
Ecosystem services contribute to livelihood development at
different spatial scales and through varying combinations
(Willemen et al., 2013). Meeting development needs, alleviating
poverty, and enhancing well-being are increasingly important
roles for PES (Bulte et al., 2008; Lipper et al., 2009; Daw et al.,
2011). However, only 52% of studies we assessed speciﬁcally
evaluated human and social capital implications of PES pro-
grammes. The lack of focus on PES social dimensions may reﬂect
the general division in the research community between those
that view PES as a development tool (e.g., Muradian et al., 2010)
and those arguing its development function is (and should be)
secondary to its conservation function (e.g., Wunder, 2008). Milder
et al. (2010) argue that the extent and inﬂuence of pro-poor PES
have been inadequately quantiﬁed. While this is certainly the case,
evidence from our study indicated that programmes can have a
general, albeit conservative, positive social impact. Certainly a lack
of evidence concerning the social impact of PES on non-participant
households within targeted communities needs further investiga-
tion (Huang et al., 2009).
In part, the confusion regarding the social impacts of PES
programmes, outlined in the preceding paragraph, arises due to
the difﬁculties in comprehensively identifying potential ES bene-
ﬁciaries and understanding how different programme strategies
are likely to inﬂuence the distribution and magnitude of ES supply
(Willemen et al., 2013). This suggests that PES may unrealistically
promote win-win outcomes by simplistically claiming to have
resolved the problems faced by earlier Integrated Conservation
and Development Programmes (ICDPs) (Muradian et al., 2013).
Research in Mexico, for example, has suggested that PES enhances
a short-term utilitarian view of conservation (Rico García-Amado
et al., 2013). In contrast, ICDPs are perceived as long-term
conservation endeavours designed for speciﬁc community-level
developments but may not be viable economically (Rico García-
Amado et al., 2013). It is signiﬁcant that the human and social
Table 1
Inclusion and exclusion criteria applied to select and determine the study sample.
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria
(1) The intervention being assessed by a study is wholly or primarily PES focused, where an
intervention is deﬁned as
An environmental externality addressed via a payment (which may or may not be
performance related) received by a seller or provider of an environmental service from a
private company, NGO, local or central government agency. The user is distinguishable from
the seller, who is not a central government agency. The buyer does not have complete control
over the production of the outcome, whereas the seller has partial or total control over the
production of the outcome. Voluntary in principle on the supply side. (Based on
adjustments to Wunder's (2005) deﬁnition by Porras et al. (2008) and Ferraro (2009))
(2) The inﬂuence of PES interventions on speciﬁc environmental, socio-economic and/or
institutional outcomes ought to be identiﬁable
(1) PES intervention is not the main aspect of the study assessed
(2) Articles focused on other market-based instruments, speciﬁcally:
 Cap and trade schemes
 Biodiversity banking (biodiversity offsetting, conservation
banking and wetland banking)
 North American and EU agri-environment schemes
 REDD/REDDþ
(3) No detailed information regarding programme environmental,
social, economic or institutional outcomes
(4) General PES discussion/opinion papers concerning broad themes
rather than speciﬁc PES programmes and their impacts
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capital measured outcomes in PES have quite broad human
development implications relating to living standards (26% of
studies examined), better access to environmental and social
services (26%), poverty alleviation (17%), food security (13%), and
resilience to environmental change (11%). These outcomes bolster
recent commentaries advocating a realistic approach to PES design
based on achieving attainable objectives (Muradian et al., 2013)
and alignment of PES and ICDP practices that captures their
respective beneﬁts (Rico García-Amado et al., 2013).
The socially transformative capacity of PES is linked to scheme
access, which is underpinned by eligibility and participation
(Mahanty et al., 2013). A number of investigations have evaluated
the extent to which ES sellers have beneﬁtted from programme
participation. The results have been mixed, although marginal
beneﬁts have been identiﬁed at the household and community
level (Milder et al., 2010). Twenty-nine per cent of studies in our
review viewed the ability to access relevant scheme information as
a major barrier to participation. In this respect social status and
wealth may affect PES participation rates even when eligibility is
not an issue (Mahanty et al., 2013). For example, where examined,
those wishing to sign-up for entry into a PES programme were
wealthier, better educated, owned larger tracts of land and were
more socially mobile compared to non-participants. This supports
the view (Mahanty et al., 2013) that skill level, education and
negotiating ability are important determinants of scheme partici-
pation. Furthermore, poor economic development policies can
constrain pro-poor livelihood strategies by failing to recognise
the underlying characteristics of the poor (Smith, 2005; Fisher et
al., 2008).
Stakeholder and community participation is vital for promoting
individual and community empowerment, enabling access to
resources and information, developing wider support networks and
access to markets, and securing economic stability and land reform
(Smith, 2005; Fisher et al., 2008). Tenure arrangements, community
Fig. 2. Critical analysis: a three part process comprising study appraisal, capital asset evaluation of PES ‘outcomes’ and deconstruction of programme arrangements.
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capacity, and coherent livelihood development strategies are critical
issues for stimulating participation (Brewer et al., 2014). Despite the
centrality of participation to programme success, its evaluation –
particularly in relation to poorer households – is largely ignored,
highlighting the limited role of social embeddedness in PES evalua-
tion (Muradian et al., 2010). This sentiment is illustrated in our
analysis, where only 27% of prior studies explicitly recognised the
need to improve poorer household uptake rates.
The choice of ES providers is fundamental for PES to achieve
signiﬁcant poverty alleviation (Muradian et al., 2010). The chosen
selection model must balance efﬁciency, effectiveness, and equity
trade-offs (Unisfera International Centre et al., 2004) with fairness
(Pascual et al., 2010) while maintaining cost-effectiveness (Chen et
al., 2010). Ultimately, selection should reﬂect participant socio-
economic circumstances and biophysical properties likely to max-
imise ES provision. We found most service sellers were farmers
(51%), communal landholders (23%) and indigenous communities
(14%), with 70% of programmes targeting one seller group. The
selection of those sellers was often made primarily on ecologically
important criteria (e.g., priority areas, biophysical conditions,
strategic service site location, land and farm characteristics, herd
size and livestock and the production of a management plan). The
use of multiple criteria was generally low; 78% of programmes
stipulated just one or two selection criteria. Still, this suggests
natural capital optimisation over social capital maximisation, as
most programmes considered few, if any, social criteria in their
eligibility requirements. Bolivia's Los Negros programme is a case
in point: the programme's criteria automatically excluded the
poorest landless immigrants living within the PES implementation
zone (Aquith et al., 2008).
Even where social criteria were considered (e.g., the Social
Development Index devised for Costa Rica's PSA programme),
they may be fundamentally at odds with the scale at which they
need to operate (Porras, 2010; Matulis, 2013). The result may be
the potential exclusion of large numbers of poorer households
and de-emphasising social welfare concerns in programme
design and implementation (WRI, 2005). However, in some cases,
particularly in relation to China's Sloped Land Conservation
Programme (SLCP), evidence suggests that poorer members of
society were effectively captured by PES programmes. Liu et al.
(2008) suggest that 30 million farming households have bene-
ﬁtted directly from the SLCP. There was a strategy to target poorer
marginalised households and communities to enhance SLCP
impact (Yin et al., 2013).
Table 2
CAF categorisation of ‘effective’ PES programme ‘measured outcomes’.
Capital asset ‘Measured Outcomes’ of PES programmes judged ‘Effective’a
Natural capital  Increase in forest size, protected area extent and decrease in deforestation
 Reduction in agricultural intensity
 Alteration in agricultural practices (e.g. adoption of programme modalities)
 PES speciﬁcally acknowledged to be an effective and efﬁcient mechanism to induce changes in land-use
 PES activities undertaken in areas of poor environmental condition
 Improvements in biodiversity (e.g. conservation of a speciﬁc species)
 Ecosystem service(s) identiﬁed
 Ecosystem service provision assessed
 Link between management practice and ecosystem service production
 Ecosystem service(s) preserved
Financial capital  Small landholders receiving payments
 Medium landholders receiving payments
 Observed increase in household income
 Diversiﬁcation of household economic activities
 Improved distribution of material wealth
 Payments favour poorer land owners
 PES participants more reliant on payments for household ﬁnances (i.e. better targeting of poorer sectors)
 PES participants have more diverse income streams than non-participants (i.e. more economically
resilient)
 Payments are sufﬁcient to meet household needs and/or provide a suitable alternative income stream
Institutional capital  Community control over natural resource-use
 Decentralised administration control over fund disbursement and contract awards
 Greater involvement of local institutions
 Improved institutional relationships and cooperation
 Institutional accountability assessed
 Increased institutional accountability and transparency
 Increased transparency in funding chain
 Providers more accountable to beneﬁciaries
 Legal and regulatory measures in place to ensure proper resource-use
Social and human
capital
 Improved food security
 Reduction in poverty
 Improved living standards
 Resilience to environmental change
 Better access to social and environmental services
 Increased poorer household participation
a We can say that there are certain ‘measured outcomes’ that are representative of an ‘effective’ PES programme. Here, our use of the
word ‘effective’ implicitly acknowledges that a ‘measured outcome’ is positive or beneﬁcial in some way. There is no predeﬁned exogenous
objective protocol for determining what ‘measured outcome’ is deemed ‘effective’; determination is rather both normative and common
sensical. These ‘measured outcomes’ derive from the coding applied to assess each individual study engaged in evaluating a PES programme.
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3.2.2. Natural capital
We found programmes extended across multiple landscape
types operating mainly in agricultural (74%) and tropical rainforest
and dry forest landscapes (65%). They ranged from lowland (69%)
to highland (48%) geographies and across rural areas (52%). These
broad landscape conﬁgurations mask high levels of heterogeneity,
even over small ranges, with most being multi-functional land-
scapes dominated by smallholder farmers (Tscharntke et al., 2012).
Most programmes (91%) were implemented over spatial scales
encompassing three or more distinct landscapes types, and
focused principally on delivering hydrological/watershed (52%),
carbon/forest (61%), biodiversity (56.5%), and food and ﬁbre (22%)
services.
Despite landscape multi-functionality, only a few programmes
targeted ES bundles (e.g., PSA in Costa Rica, Socio Bosque in
Ecuador). Our ﬁndings contrast with Martin-Ortega et al. (2013),
who found 73% of PWS transactions involved bundled services.
Ingram et al. (2014) recently argued that bundling and stacking
ESs can reduce the risks associated with unstable markets. How-
ever, 78% of programmes we examined focused quite narrowly on
one or two ESs. Similarly, with respect to the land-use practices
adopted by participants, 74% of programmes relied heavily on one
or two management practices to achieve ES provision. The
assumption that individual or coupled land-use practices are
sufﬁcient to generate ESs at adequate rates, spatial scales, and
levels of availability currently informs most PES programme
design (Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). In total, 84% of studies
that we examined measured aspects of natural capital primarily
through documenting land-use changes, rather than focusing on
the provision of jointly-occurring ESs. Land-use change is likely a
poor proxy for ES provision because change occurs, generally, as a
consequence of utilising just one or two land-use practices. This is
insufﬁcient to guarantee service supply especially in the case of
multiple ESs (Bennett et al., 2009; Raudseppe-Hearne et al., 2010).
Further, failing to acknowledge the connections between targeted
ESs in PES programmes hinders the ability to assess ES provision,
distribution and trade-offs, as well as to identify adequately factors
Table 3
A summary of the ﬁnal selected articles: their geographical focus, the PES schemes investigated and their scale of operation.
Geographical location No. of studiesa PES programme and scale: local (L), regional (R), national (N)
Costa Rica 16 PSAb (N)
Mexico 7 PSAHc (N), PSA-CABSAd (N), Fidecoagua (L)
Ecuador 4 Pimampiro (L), PROFAFORe (R), SocioBosque (L)
Nicaragua 4 RISEMPf (L), PPSA-Hg (L), San Pedro del Norte – PASOLACh (L)
Bolivia 2 Los Negros (L), NKMCAPi (L)
Columbia 1 RISEMP (L)
Honduras 1 Jesus de Otoro – PASOLAC (L)
Brazil 1 Bolsa Floresta (L)
Madagascar 2 Durrel Conservation Trust PES Scheme (L)
Mozambique 1 Carbon Livelihoods Project
Kenya 1 WKIEMPj (R)
Cambodia 1 Payments for wildlife friendly products, community-based ecotourism, bird nest scheme (L)
China 5 SLCPk (N), NFPl (N)
a 44 Case studies. The numbers do not sum to 44 as some studies focused on more than one PES programme.
b Pagos por servicios ambientales.
c Payments for hydrological environmental services.
d PES programme for carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation.
e Programmea Face de Forestaciûn del Ecuador.
f Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Ecosystem Management Project – operates transnationally but in each area at a local level.
g Proyecto de Pagos Por Servicios Ambientales Hidricos.
h Programma para la Agricultura Sostenible en Laderas da América Central – operates transnationally but in each area at a local level.
i Noel Kempff Mercado Climate Action Project.
j Western Kenya Integrated Ecosystem Management Project.
k Sloping Land Conversion Programme.
l National Forest Programme.
Fig. 3. Theoretical approaches applied by PES studies: emphasising the discourse in
which PES development is situated.
Fig. 4. Drivers motivating PES scheme development. *Other refers to: urbanisation,
population expansion, food security and biodiversity threat.
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affecting service delivery such as the extent and type of land-use
practices adopted by participants (Bürkhard et al., 2010; de Groot
et al., 2010). Not accounting for this information could increase
transaction costs, lead to contradictory regulations, degrade mar-
ket compatibility, and forfeit potential win-win opportunities
(Deal et al., 2012).
Similar to other research (Landen-Mills and Porras, 2002;
Wunder et al., 2008), we found land-use practices were frequently
geared towards forest protection (65%), reforestation and affores-
tation (52%), and reductions in extractive activities (30%). How-
ever, the extent to which these land-use practices deliver ESs is
dependent upon high adoption rates and consistent employment
by participants (Wunder et al., 2008). Adopted land management
practices were generally regarded as effective in producing the
stipulated land-use changes. In Colombia's Regional Integrated
Silvopastoral Ecosystem Management Programme (RISEMP), for
example, signiﬁcant reductions in degraded pasture (78.3–7.1 ha)
and natural pasture without trees (721–239 ha) alongside
increases in improved pasture with high tree density (2.2–266 ha)
were observed (Pagiola et al., 2010). At the global scale, increases
in forest extent and decreases in deforestation rates were four-
fold more frequently identiﬁed than reductions in forest size
and increases in deforestation rates. For example, China's SLCP
converted 408,000 ha yr1 of cropland to forest and grass-
land during the initial pilot phase (1998–2001), and a further
2.3 million ha yr1 from 2002 to 2003 (Bennett, 2008). Further-
more, one-third of studies demonstrated a notable reduction in
the degree of agricultural intensity undertaken within project
areas, with almost half of those suggesting shifts away from
traditional cropping activities towards the development of timber
plantations and forest management or protection.
The adoption of management practices can be hampered by
technical, infrastructure, and payment constraints. For instance,
we observed land management practice restrictions (27% of cases)
and farm area or forest size requirements if taking land out of
production was required (11%). This was particularly evident for
programmes with speciﬁc criteria for management practices such
as minimum farm size (e.g., PROFAFOR, Ecuador) or speciﬁc
management plans (e.g., Los Negros, Bolivia). Reducing the num-
ber of management practices may increase the probability that
they are jointly adopted and practiced (Engel et al., 2008; Wunder
et al., 2008). However, although this action may increase the
overall implementation of management practices the result may
still be insufﬁcient provision of ES because of the limited number
of management practices employed (Bennett et al., 2009).
Even with 84% of studies targeting particular ecosystem ser-
vices, 73% lacked evidence to demonstrate programmes were
providing those services. This supports the view that land-use
changes are not easily translated into ES provision (e.g., Bond,
2007; Wunder et al., 2008; Bennett et al., 2009). We found that
62% of studies described the links between land management
practices and ESs as assumed, with only 30% acknowledging a
robust relationship between management practices and ES provi-
sion. The assessment of ES delivery is primarily associated with
programmes focused on carbon management, for which clear
protocols measuring carbon storage and sequestration rates exist
(Wunder et al., 2008). For example, China's National Forest
Fig. 5. (a) Study design (b) Study mode (c) Data analysis. All numbers refer to percentage of studies.
Fig. 6. Investigative constraints of reviewed studies at the sample, method and
analysis stages. All numbers refer to percentage of studies.
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Conservation Programme (NFCP) is estimated to have sequestered
21 Tg of carbon between 1998 and 2004 and reduced carbon
emissions by 23 Tg over the same period (Liu et al., 2008).
To compensate for the short-fall in domestic timber supply,
however, China rapidly expanded imports, thereby ‘exporting’ its
‘timber footprint’ abroad (Liu et al., 2008).
In 40% of studies, there were calls to improve the assessment
and monitoring of ES production and land-use linkages. The lack of
data and lag-effects makes it difﬁcult to determine ES changes in
most studies. The inability to adequately deﬁne and quantify ESs
has in general reduced programme effectiveness and efﬁciency
(Engel et al., 2008; Kroeger 2013). Overall understanding of
dynamics is typically rudimentary and assumes sometimes ten-
uous causal linkages. This highlights the need for pre-planning,
baseline studies, and effective demonstration projects (Yin et al.,
2013). Bennett et al. (2009: 1395) argued that “without knowledge
about the relationships among ecosystem services, we are at risk
of incurring unwanted trade-offs, squandering opportunities to
take advantage of synergies, and possibly experiencing dramatic
and unexpected changes in provision of ecosystem services”,
a sentiment that we would reinforce.
3.2.3. Financial capital
Not surprisingly, two thirds of studies focused on the ﬁnancial
capital implications of PES programmes. The potential of PES to
strengthen livelihood development strategies rests upon the
ﬁnancial capacity of programmes to support household and
community needs through the provision of payments (Wunder,
2008; Pascual et al., 2010; Narloch et al., 2011). Payments to ES
providers were generally annual, ex post, on a per hectare basis,
and for ‘delivered’ ES proxies (i.e., land-use changes) rather than
ES supply. A number of schemes were sensitive to the variations in
effort that different land-use practices require and paid accord-
ingly (Wunder et al., 2008). For example, Costa Rica's PSA provided
(in 2009) US$64–80 ha1 yr1 for forest protection but US$82–
98 ha1 yr1 for reforestation. Ecuador's Socio Bosque programme
employed a descending payment scale, reducing incremental per
hectare payments as the area enroled increased. The majority of
programmes (60%) implemented a single payment system rather
than adopting a multiple streams approach, with payments made
predominantly in the form of cash (62%) or technical assistance
(21%). Just 30% of programmes opted for two payment modes
(primarily cash and technical assistance), while only 9% employed
three payment modes (i.e. the addition of in-kind payments) such
as Ecuador's PROFAFOR and China's SLCP schemes. Consequently,
the payment design of most programmes had an important effect
on their capacity to aid individuals, households and communities
because they fail to utilise the broadest array of available options
(Wunder et al., 2008).
In some cases payments were made to families (e.g., Cambo-
dia's payments for wildlife friendly products) or to communities
(e.g., Madagascar's Durrell Conservation Trust scheme), but gen-
erally 58% of programmes allocated payments to small- (2–30 ha)
and medium-sized (30–60 ha) landholders, versus 22% to large-
size (60þ ha) landholders. This may reﬂect informed programme
targeting of the poorest sectors to maximise the beneﬁt from
payments (Narloch et al., 2011). For example, due to the nature of
its mandate China's SLCP preferentially targeted poorer land-
owners (Bennett, 2008; Liu et al., 2008). At the other extreme,
Costa Rica's PSA generally beneﬁtted wealthier landowners
because larger farms acquired proportionally more money
(Miranda et al., 2003). Ecuador's Socio Bosque programme was
hampered by the scheme's failure to distribute and apportion
individual and collective contracts in a manner that sufﬁciently
accounted for the number of beneﬁciaries per contract and their
poverty status (Krause and Loft, 2013). However, Narloch et al.
(2013) have demonstrated that conservation auctions, in relation
to distributional outlay, can minimise the ‘traditional’ trade-offs
between fairness and effectiveness. In addition, our analysis also
suggests that payment distribution may be inﬂuenced by a range
of other factors, including collective land ownership (e.g., indigen-
ous communal lands), shared needs, technical assistance, land
security and property rights, proximity to protected areas, and the
type of scheme in operation.
We found that household level impacts of programmes were
mixed. Fifty per cent of studies suggested programmes positively
increased household income, particularly in China. Many cases
failed, however, to provide evaluations of income streams along-
side these observations. Where such information was detailed, 29%
of studies demonstrated payments contributed between 0% and
50% of household income, with just 8% showing payments con-
tributing to more than 50% of household income. This demon-
strates the highly variable nature of payment contributions to
household incomes.
Household wealth, particularly for comparatively poorer
households, was identiﬁed by 11% of studies as an additional
barrier to participation and, by extension, to programme effec-
tiveness. Although 50% of studies established that programmes
enabled a diversiﬁcation of household economic activities, only
12% described payments as sufﬁcient to meet household needs or
provide an alternative income stream. Generally, payment con-
tributions provided insufﬁcient income to enhance household
economic productivity and diversity. Yet promoting household
and community capabilities relies in part on generating adequate
working capital (Smith, 2005) and stimulating wider rural eco-
nomic growth (WRI, 2005). Expanding the number of revenue
streams from the natural resource-base lessens the risks for
families and communities relying on a single market (Ingram
et al., 2014). Providing access to functioning markets and increas-
ing household wealth is essential for generating diverse income
streams, securing sustainability, and driving innovation (Smith,
2005; WRI, 2005; Wunder, 2008; Narloch et al., 2011).
Addressing the income stream shortfall as a constraint to
improving living standards was mentioned by 59% of studies.
Only 20% of studies demonstrated that PES schemes reduced
wealth inequity. This has dual effects on poor landholders and on
providers who bear opportunity costs (Wunder, 2008; Pascual
et al., 2010; Narloch et al., 2011); 43% of studies highlighted
opportunity costs as signiﬁcant barriers to participation. A further
38% cited the low level of programme payments as responsible
for reducing uptake and contract renewal rates. The studies we
examined suggested that wealth distribution and equity are also
inﬂuenced by factors related to payment design and broader
institutional and socio-economic circumstances, in particular:
sub-optimal targeting; land entitlement and formal property
rights; centralisation of payment distribution; the utilisation of
non-monetary payments; elite capture and under-representation
of the highly marginalised; diversion of funds from the local
community to project management budgets; asymmetric distri-
bution of funds between communities and concessionaires;
gender differences; community status and reductions in the
extent of inequalities. Pirard et al. (2010) argued that in order
to mitigate these complex and diverse issues PES (more broadly)
should emulate the RISEMP agro-ecosystem business model as an
example of a sustainable and self-sufﬁcient wealth generating
scheme.
Many of the issues concerning payment amounts, contributions
to household incomes, wealth distribution, and equity are directly
related to programme contracts. Negotiating these issues requires
permanency, ﬂexibility and compliance in contractual agreements
(Ferraro, 2008). Programme permanency and contract ﬂexibility
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were relatively heterogeneous, and determined by a range of
factors including the adoption of speciﬁc management practices
(e.g., Costa Rica's PSA scheme), service seller decision-making (e.g.
Bolivia's Los Negros programme), and contractual extension (e.g.,
Ecuador's PROFAFOR and Pimampiro programmes). Eleven per
cent of studies described the need to extend the time frame of
projects and guarantee permanency. A further 13% acknowledged
the need to improve contractual arrangements for the beneﬁt of
agreement holders (e.g. in terms of payment amounts), by improv-
ing programme permanency and renewal options as well as
allowing more ﬂexibility with regards to sanctioned management
actions. Dealing with risk and uncertainty regarding payment
cessation, adverse selection and moral hazard, and the extent to
which negotiated agreements spread unfairness by embedding
asymmetric power relations, is vital (Ferraro, 2008; Wunder et al.,
2008; Milne and Adams, 2012).
Solving the targeting and monitoring conundrum is also
important (Sommerville et al., 2011; Wünscher and Engel, 2012).
The priority for targeting has to be determining an effective basis
for directing payments to locations that will enhance scheme
additionality at least-cost while balancing potentially competing
conservation and development objectives (Wünscher and Engel,
2012). Similarly, monitoring requires attention on multiple fronts:
deciding what is to be measured and meaningfully quantiﬁed
across the range of capital assets; identifying who is monitoring,
how frequently, and at what cost; and linking land use and ES
provision with payment heterogeneity (Sommerville et al., 2011).
Effective monitoring requires stability over time (Lin and
Nakamura, 2012). Ensuring agreement obligations are fulﬁlled is
thus critical but only 48% of programmes we examined had a high
degree of conditionality and 36% had medium to low levels of
compliance. In theory most programmes subscribe to annual
monitoring by local stakeholders and/or government-related ofﬁcials,
with many instituting sanctions for non-compliance. In Brazil's Bolsa
Floresta programme, for example, a system of penalty cards is used to
determine non-compliance and designate the appropriate sanction
(Pereira, 2010). However, across all programmes, applications of
sanctions are relatively rare. Clearly, substantial improvements are
needed to make PES programme monitoring effective (Schomers and
Matzdorf, 2013).
At the global scale “there is an urgent need to mobilise
substantial additional funds and develop effective mechanisms
for global biodiversity conservation” (Hein et al., 2013: 91). Fauzi
and Anna (2013) identiﬁed ‘ﬁscal constraints' as limits to long-
term programme ﬁnancial viability. We found that 48% of studies
declared ﬁnancial viability as a major barrier to PES effectiveness.
Recently, a number of nascent watershed investment programmes
have become inactive due to inadequate ﬁnancing (Bennett et al.,
2013). Programme investment levels vary widely, with national
programme implementation requiring high levels of ﬁnancing.
China's SLCP was designed as a 10 year programme with a total
budget of over US$40 billion (Bennett, 2008) and Costa Rica's PSA
programme received US$175–206 million (1997–2008) (Porras,
2010). Mexico's Fidecoagua, a local programme, received only US
$0.5 million annually (2003–2009). Our analysis indicates that
external donor investments, loans and grants are essential sources
of ﬁnancial capital, guaranteeing the ﬁnancial viability of many
PES programmes. Seventy four per cent of programmes received
some form of external donor support, with 59% supported by a
single donor and 41% by two or more donors. External donors
range from international conservation agencies (e.g., Conservation
International – see Niesten et al., 2010) and development agencies
(e.g., Swiss Development Cooperation) to major international
corporations (e.g., British Petroleum Amoco, PaciﬁCorp). However,
the most frequent external donor support organisations were the
World Bank (WB) and Global Environment Facility (GEF), which in
many cases provided full projecting costs or initial start-up capital.
Indeed, WB and GEF have supplied 60% (approximately US$11
Billion) of global biodiversity aid over the past three decades (Hein
et al., 2013).
Transaction costs impose signiﬁcant constraints on programme
effectiveness (59% of studies). To ensure that locally-derived
sources of ﬁnance can support programmes in the long-term,
which 34% of studies highlighted as necessary to secure, requires
that the full range and magnitude of transaction costs are
accounted for (Fauzi and Anna, 2013; Marshall, 2013; McCann,
2013). The prohibitive nature of programme transaction costs
(McCann et al., 2005; McCann, 2013) may dictate that bilateral
donor funding is essential to implement PES programmes. Legrand
et al. (2013) argued that the securing of national and international
funds by programmes ought to be viewed as an institutional
triumph.
3.2.4. Institutional capital
Our analysis supports the view that institutional factors of PES
programmes are ‘undervalued’ (Pascual et al., 2010) as only 58% of
studies assessed institutional capital and context. There are
typically knowledge gaps relating to direct and indirect, and short
and long-term institutional performance (Legrand et al., 2013).
Clearly, “PES systems are never established in an institutional
vacuum” (Vatn, 2010: 1247). Programme success relies on
establishing institutions and maintaining functional institutional
relationships (Ostrom, 2005), and strengthening institutional
frameworks and ties (Legrand et al., 2013). Forty four per cent of
studies noted that programmes improved institutional capacity,
cooperation between sectors and across groups, and the level of
engagement with local organisations (e.g., Costa Rica's PSA
scheme) (Legrand et al., 2013). Yin et al. (2013) suggest that
grass-roots inclusion, through direct stakeholder inputs, improves
long-term PES programme stability and reduces inefﬁciencies.
Extolling the virtues of cooperation, 50% of studies expressed the
view that developing improved institutional coordination was
especially important for facilitating and enhancing capacity-
building and technical assistance. Thus, for institutions, achieving
lasting outcomes requires understanding and assessing the rela-
tional interactions between agents, institutions, and sectors, and
their collective cultural effects (Campbell et al., 2010; Legrand
et al., 2013).
Legitimacy, transparency and accountability in particular are
central for successfully building institutional capacity and increas-
ing effectiveness (Lockwood et al., 2010; Ingram et al., 2014).
Eleven per cent of studies that we examined advocated the need to
optimise governance, accountability, and transparency to improve
programme effectiveness. Only 44% of studies addressed matters
of institutional accountability. However, of these, 73% registered
improvements in accountability and transparency. This refers
mainly to instances where legal and regulatory mechanisms
enabled appropriate resource-use (73%), as well as examples in
which the funding chain was described as more transparent (27%)
and the level of accountability between providers and beneﬁci-
aries was improved (36%). Notably, however, 36% of studies still
indicated reduced transparency and accountability regarding
institutional arrangements and operations.
The importance of property rights (i.e. their distribution,
allocation, and social embeddedness) for PES effectiveness is
widely acknowledged (Lin and Nakamura, 2012; Schomers and
Matzdorf, 2013). Thirty two per cent of studies identiﬁed the lack
of deﬁned property rights and land tenure arrangements as a clear
barrier to programme effectiveness. Clearly-deﬁned tenure
arrangements, which acknowledge local customary rights, may
legitimise secure long-term resource access through the use of
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entitlements. Conversely, inappropriate tenure reforms could
negatively affect livelihoods, and so need to be sensitive to
contextual factors such as local power asymmetries, gender
exclusion, or poor legal documentation of customary rights (WRI,
2005; Fisher et al., 2008). For example, consolidation of current
inequalities has reinforced disparities in resource allocation and
power structures with respect to water access in Ecuador's
Pimampiro programme (Rodríquez de Francisco et al., 2013).
Regulation of ownership and property rights needs to be open
for transparent and simple ﬁscal mechanisms to operate in
relation to payment arrangements (Fauzi and Anna, 2013). The
legislative landscape is particularly important for land reforms, as
government recognition provides legitimacy and legal instruments
to formally institute land rights. Part of this involves access to legal
remedies for PES programme damages (Kaul et al., 2003). Despite
the importance of the legal landscape, the signiﬁcance of the
legislative framework in which PES programmes operate was
mentioned in only 36% of studies.
Regarding the overall involvement of the State in PES, institu-
tional governance programmes are considered predominantly
state-centric (Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). However, in cases
where the State has the primary responsibility for being the
originator and operator of programmes, only 28% of schemes we
examined were of this type (e.g. China's SLCP and NFCP). In some
circumstances these centralised tendencies may constrain partici-
pation options. For example, in a 2003 survey concerning SLCP
operations fewer than 50% of participants thought that villages
had been adequately consulted by State authorities regarding
programme design and implementation, and 53% of households
felt centralised control constrained their participation choice
(Bennett, 2008). As Stanton et al. (2010) highlight, there can be a
stark difference in the role played by the State compared to private
and voluntary sectors. All sectors procured environmental services
but government and related bodies represented ES buyers in 50%
of our cases, while private and voluntary sectors each accounted
for 18% of buyers. This observation accords with those made
previously by Brouwer et al. (2011).
Programmes operated in chieﬂy agrarian locations meaning
that most service sellers were rural and community farmers;
where government or private sector service sellers played a
minimal role (3% and 6% of studies, respectively). Institutionally,
those responsible for connecting ES providers and ES beneﬁciaries,
and facilitating fund disbursement are the intermediaries (Huber-
Stearns et al., 2013), who were active in 96% of programmes we
examined (exceeding the 82% identiﬁed by Martin-Ortega et al.,
2013). This demonstrates the crucial roles played by intermedi-
aries in delivering effective PES programmes (see also Lin and
Nakamura, 2012). Intermediaries may be individuals, groups, or
organisations, and operate at different scales and in different
economic sectors (Huber-Stearns et al., 2013). Local and national
governments represented intermediaries in 40% of cases, usually
in the form of semi-autonomous bodies acting as government
subsidiaries (e.g., Comisión Nacional Forestal (CONAFOR) in
Mexico and Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal (FONA-
FIFO) in Costa Rica). NGOs acted as intermediaries in a third of
programmes (e.g., Fundación para el Desarrollo de la Cordillera
Volcánica (FUNDECOR) in Costa Rica, Nitlapan in Nicaragua, and
Corporación para el Desarrollo de los Recursos Naturales (CEDER-
ENA) in Ecuador). It could be argued that government is the most
inﬂuential and powerful intermediary actor. Perhaps this is not
surprising given the ‘functional diversity’ intermediaries display,
for example, as mediators, information providers, arbitrators,
administrators, and core network facilitators (Thuy et al., 2010;
Huber-Stearns et al., 2013).
Clearly the inﬂuence of external intermediaries is substantial,
particularly so in grass-roots community-driven situations, which
emphasises the importance of including intermediary partners to
represent the local context and stakeholder views (Thuy et al.,
2010). Engagement of local intermediaries does have a decentra-
lising effect, which we found in relation to local community
oversight and fund disbursement (Thuy et al., 2010; Huber-
Stearns et al., 2013). The involvement of fewer intermediary actors
can reduce the negative impacts associated with organisational
competition (Thuy et al., 2010; Brouwer et al., 2011). Consistent
with this view, we found about 75% of programmes involved only
a single intermediary partner. When well-run, intermediaries can
help reduce transaction costs, and supply expertise to draw-up
contracts and monitor PES-related activities. They do so via a
complex combination of relationship-building, establishing repu-
tation, and adapting to location conditions (Thuy et al., 2010).
Intermediary functions and actions are not always, however,
positive or allied to local sensitivities. They can legitimise and
de-legitimise processes; decentralisation does not always favour
beneﬁcial outcomes if it fails to take account of elite capture and
accountability issues (Thuy et al., 2010; Huber-Stearns et al., 2013).
Actors in PES may play multiple roles. One quarter of projects
we examined were initiated by service buyers, higher than the 16%
observed by Martin-Ortega et al. (2013). Of those, 50% were
initiated by national governments. To some extent this State-
centric inﬂuence was counter-balanced by signiﬁcant NGO invol-
vement (43%) in project initiation (lower in our study than the 58%
of NGO project promoters identiﬁed by Martin-Ortega et al., 2013).
However, NGOs may have considerable inﬂuence on national and
sub-national governance and development issues, land-use policy,
and advocacy linked to incentive-based mechanisms. This inﬂu-
ence has grown alongside rapid sector expansion e.g. in Kenya, the
number of NGOs (of all types) increased 15-fold between 1990 and
2008 and in Tanzania, the number of NGOs multiplied by approxi-
mately 250 times between 1990 and 2000. Growth in the number
of NGOs has been witnessed worldwide (Banks and Hulme, 2012).
Lane and Morrison (2006: 232), for example, referring mainly to
the environmental NGO sector in Australia, noted that – “the
extent of NGO involvement, both formal and informal, in environ-
mental policy and management is so widespread […] NGOs (and
other forms of civil society) now assume a dominant, even-pre-
eminent role in the ascendant model of governance”.
Due to their ubiquity and the niche NGOs have created for
themselves between the State and Civil society, especially in
developing countries, they have been cast and recast as both hero
and villain: standing-up for the rights of the poor, dispossessed
and marginalised; combating anti-democratic values embodied in
poorly governed States and corporations and promoting environ-
mental sustainability; yet failing to make headway in many of
these areas through gradually de-politicising and re-focusing on
service-delivery, up-scaling and technocratic professionalisation
aligned to donor priorities and funding, media image and political
connections. This series of transformations has led to increased
concerns regarding their underlying accountability, credibility and
capacity to actively promote and reﬂect civil society values
(Bebbington, 2004, 2005; Holmes, 2011; Banks and Hulme, 2012;
Rusca and Schwartz, 2012; AbouAssi, 2013). Nevertheless, the
development of so-called ‘horizontal’ governance, in which PES
has sometimes been contextualised, has been viewed as promot-
ing decentralisation and beneﬁtting grass-roots concerns
(Agrawal, 2001; Barbosa, 2003; WRI, 2005). There are those that
remain unconvinced and see such developments as sponsoring
and implementing the priorities of an elite group of wealthy global
institutions (McAfee and Shapiro, 2010; Holmes, 2011). In a
number of cases, however, projects originated as multi-party
programmes. Almost one-third of schemes had more than one
initiator e.g. the State and a NGO or utility, indicating a relatively
high degree of cross-collaboration, balance of competences and
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inﬂuences in relation to programme design and implementation
(Martin-Ortega et al., 2013).
Collectively then, reappraising the institutional relationships
between the actors facilitating programme operations is crucial
(Pascual et al., 2010; Muradian et al., 2010). Our analysis indicates
that government inﬂuence extends across the entire PES system,
whereas the involvement of the private and voluntary sectors is
more restricted. Expanding private sector participation, particu-
larly as ES sellers and project initiators, presents new opportu-
nities. In our review, 16% of studies recommended encouraging
the private sector to pay for ESs as a means of promoting
PES effectiveness. Engaging with the private sector provides a
mechanism to increase direct investment, supply needed know-
how and facilities, and reduce state centrism through local and
national ﬁrm participation (WRI, 2005; Blackman and Woodward,
2010). Business and industry account for 7% of global investment
in watershed payment schemes, so there is clearly substantial
room for PES programme growth (Bennett et al., 2013). Private
sector demand for PES programmes is growing as the reasons
motivating participation multiply (Waage et al., 2007). National
ﬁrms appear more likely to invest in multiple ecosystem services
(Koellner et al., 2010). Furthering private sector integration repre-
sents a means for expanding the portfolio diversity of PES opera-
tions across scales as well as enhancing corporate social
responsibility and widening sustainability (Rioþ20, 2012).
4. Conclusion
PES programmes have recently been subjected to mounting
scrutiny (Pirard et al., 2010; Muradian and Rival, 2012). Our CAF
analytical approach in a systematic review has provided consider-
able insight into the workings and effectiveness of PES schemes
and their ‘measured outcomes’ (see also Supporting information
Table S14). We identiﬁed a number of important issues related to
essential components (or absence thereof) needed for functional,
effective PES schemes: proper protocols for assessing ES produc-
tion and distribution; adequate accounting for social, human and
institutional capital assets in PES design and programme out-
comes; and viable long-term funding arrangements. Like Martin-
Ortega et al. (2013), our analysis indicated that the theoretical
underpinnings of PES, whether inclined towards Wunder's (2005)
archetype or Muradian et al.'s (2010) model, are quite different to
the real-world implementation of these schemes labelled with the
same terminology. In this regard, there are opportunities for
aligning theory and practice. We suggest three research themes
that require further development if PES is to represent an effective
natural resource management option in the future: connecting
land-use practices and ES provision (e.g., Yin et al., 2013); ensuring
programmes provide adequate socio-economic contributions to
livelihood development by focusing on the poorest sectors (e.g.,
Ingram et al., 2014); and developing appropriate property rights
regimes and building institutional capacity and institutions that
are robust, inclusive, transparent and accountable (e.g., Legrand
et al., 2013).
In attempting to address whether PES programmes are effec-
tive, the answer is not straightforward. A diversity of PES pro-
grammes exist, each of which produces a different set of measured
outcomes when assessed through a CAF lens. Any argument calling
for PES to be employed as generic solutions to natural resource
management challenges requires careful scrutiny. What constitu-
tes impacts (good or bad) worthy of action depends on societal,
political, and stakeholder values (Rudd, 2004; Ostrom, 2005). It is
clear that both locally-administered and nationally-governed PES
programmes can be effective and have positive measured out-
comes across multiple capital assets. However, important issues
remain regarding how PES schemes negotiate effectiveness, efﬁ-
ciency, and equity trade-offs. These depend on how programmes
are constructed and administered, as well as monitored and
evaluated, within an appropriate context.
In designing schemes and mitigating trade-offs, we advocate a
function-oriented and outcome-led approach. That is, identifying
and prioritising a set of scheme outcomes (the desired end-
products of a programme) and reverse engineering the structural
and institutional arrangements of a programme (the underlying
functional properties of a scheme) to achieve those aims. Using a
CAF approach in this regard may help achieve an optimal balance
between conservation and development outcomes. The precise
composition of conservation and development objectives needs to
account for locally-generated concerns, and not result from a one-
size ﬁts-all approach. There is potential for substantial PES
expansion internationally, but these opportunities should be
viewed alongside other natural resource management and poverty
alleviation policy instruments. They should be subject to testing in
with/without policy analyses in a way that accounts for causal
linkages between intervention options, ES ﬂows, and proxy mea-
sures for ES in the ﬁeld, and programme outcomes. PES pro-
grammes should not necessarily be regarded as superior to other
intervention options or a panacea to be implemented on
blind faith.
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